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Abstract

Relations with China are more important than ever not even just for the United States, but
the whole world. With Donald Trump as our President for now, general relations with China are
on unsteady water since there is no predicting what either side might do. With the importance of
Chinese relations so topical today, the base of the official U.S.-China relations would be just as
important. Many people think Richard Nixon was the President who established these ties with
China, but it was actually Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter had to trek through the muck set by
President Nixon and Ford to establish official diplomatic ties with China. There was a lot of
promises both Presidents before Carter made to the Chinese and President Carter had to work
with the Chinese under those conditions. This historical event has been downplayed by the
media and the American public because of the conditions Carter agreed to and the timing of this
event. President Carter's intentions in the beginning were pure when it came to Chinese
relations, but by the end, the intentions were tainted because of secret deals and his cabinet
members. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter's intentions behind establishing official diplomatic
ties with China were to help normalize the nation of China into the global community, to
maintain a semi-healthy relationship with Taiwan, and to assist the United States strategically
against the Soviet Union.

The People's Republic of China is now a force to be reckoned with and the United States
of America still cannot outline the intent behind their relationship. The U.S. tends to tread in the
murky water when it comes to outlining their intentions especially with their relationship with
China. The United States' intentions with China have not all been transparent. China and the
U.S. encountered each other since the 19th century, but nothing close to establishing official
diplomatic ties. In the early 1970s with the Nixon administration, the possibility to establish
these ties appeared on the United States' radar. This occurred when President Nixon personally
visited Communist China, a first for a U.S. President. Since Nixon's visit, China has undergone
massive industrialization and economic changes which have allowed Chinese leaders to engage
in global diplomacy. One main factor that helped China develop into the world power it is today
was establishing diplomatic ties with the United States. Since Nixon's visit, each President has
had to decide how their administration would engage China. President Jimmy Carter decided to
create official diplomatic ties with China. While foreign policy experts consider President
Jimmy Carter's track record to be weak, they do praise his efforts to formalize diplomatic ties
with China. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter's intentions behind establishing official diplomatic
ties with China were to help normalize the nation of China into the global community, to
maintain a semi-healthy relationship with Taiwan, and to assist the United States strategically
against the Soviet Union.
In the 1960s and the l 970s, the United States mulled the possibility of engaging with
China. During his presidency, Richard Nixon and former National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger spearheaded the United States' diplomatic ties with China. Scholars consider
Kissinger to be the impetus for establishing relations with China who managed to get Nixon on

board, but it was Nixon who planted the seed to open a relationship with China.1 With that said,
Kissinger was the first major U.S. official to come out publicly in favor of a relationship with
China in 1969. Scholars give most of the credit to Kissinger because of his active involvement
after Nixon.
Initially, Kissinger was very skeptical about his trip to China and even wondered if it was
going to be worth the time and effort.2 There were also added difficulties to establishing
relations between the two countries. One of these was the fact that China was doubtful about a
Nixon presidency. The doubt spawned from China wondering if Nixon would actually reach out
and make the right accommodations for China. Additionally, each country had to contend with
fears of being taken advantage of and the legacy of past relations. The last added difficulty was
that almost all communication and meetings had to occur in secret because the U.S. decided to
invade Cambodia in 1970, which China opposed. This factor made each step more time
conswning since every circumstance and cover-up had to be perfect, so neither country would
withstand a public relations debacle. Regardless of all the obstacles, the timing ended up being
perfect for this to occur.3 The Soviet Union decided to oppose the Chinese along their border,
which caused the U.S. to side with China. The U.S. also envisioned the establishment of a
relationship with China as an opportunity to unsettle the Soviet Union, but they knew they would
have to take small steps to mend the damage of this historically hostile relationship.
In February 1972 (right before the presidential election), U.S. President Nixon visited
China and met with Chairman Mao Zedong along with other Chinese officials to continue

James Mann, About Face: A History ofAmerica's Curious Relationship with Chino, from Nixon to
Clinton. (New York City: Vintage, 2000) 19.
2
Patrick Tyler, A Great Woll: An Investigative History. (New York City: The Century Foundation, 1999) 114.
1

3 James Mann, About Face, 24.

nurturing a good relationship between the two countries. According to Nixon's notes that are
now declassified and in the National Archive, the Chinese wanted to build up their world
credentials, repossess Taiwan in general, and for the United States to get out of Asia. 4 The
United States wanted Indochina relations, a restraint in the spread of communism, and to reduce
the threat of a confrontation by a Chinese superpower. Both countries sought to reduce the
danger of a confrontation and/or conflict, stability in Asia, and a restraint on the U.S.S.R. This
was because both countries did not want to end up in a war because of miscommunication and
the U.S.S.R. was starting to threaten possible invasion along China's borders. The talks were
semi-one sided since Mao knew Nixon needed this trip to go perfectly to obtain political points
in the upcoming election, so Nixon had relatively low input on many of his goals. This trip and
the discussion that occurred were not planned to be as significant as it ended up being, but these
two leaders started plotting the future for the rest of Asia.
The results of these talks were mixed, but it was still productive in the eyes of the Nixon
administration. Nixon had a plan to essentially trade the strong relationship with Taiwan for help
in Vietnam, but this Vietnam goal was eliminated before he even left the United States. Nixon
did, however, accomplish other countries' support towards communistic expansion to come to a
standstill. China achieved more by definitely having an outlet to build their world credentials
with the United States and also with their requests on Taiwan. Nixon could not provide all their
requests and the establishment of official diplomatic ties in that moment because of politics. But
secret meetings occurred after between both countries' officials about how each side will keep
their promises. Nixon and Kissinger promised the Chinese that their requests on Taiwan and the
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establishment of official diplomatic ties would occur after the election cycle. This would never
end up happening for a series of reasons.
Nixon's opening to China shook the foundations of how Americans viewed the world and
even the Cold War. But all this was undermined by the Watergate scandal. Nixon did not have
enough time in his next term to follow through all the deals he made with China. Nixon ended
up resigning in 1974 and passing the torch of the China relationship to President Gerald Ford.
When this occurred, the initial relationship between the U.S. and China was completely
jeopardized because most of the deals made with the Nixon administration were all in secret.
Kissinger conducted damage control and soothed the anxiety of worried Chinese leaders: This
was possible because he was staying on as National Security Advisor under President Ford.
Kissinger also explained that Ford would share the same goals as Nixon.
Under the Ford administration, the United States and China became tacit allies. The main
factor that kept these two states together at least as a remote ally was their shared hatred for the
Soviet Union. The elephant in the room between the Ford administration and China was the fact
that he couldn't normalize diplomatic relations with the Chinese. This was because he could not
suffer the possible political consequences. His own party had more conservative nominees, like
Ronald Reagan, who were trying to take his nomination. The Chinese leaders were highly
offended by this and they felt like they were being taken advantage of because they helped
simmer North Korea to not attack the United States when they were struggling in Vietnam.5
Ford did visit China during his presidency, but the trip ended up being more of a charade than
anything else. Under the Ford administration, Kissinger did most of the wheeling and dealing.
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He ended up making a lot of public statements and secret deals that completely contradicted each
other and jeopardized what was left of the U.S. and China relationship. At one point, Secretary
of State Kissinger went so far that he "publicly reassured the new Chinese leadership that the
United States would regard a Russian threat against China as 'a grave matter"' according to a
New York Times article in 1976. This article goes on to state that "administration officials said

this was the strongest public formulation of the United States interest in China's security, but that
it is identical to what Mr. Kissinger has believed since 1969 and what he has privately stated to
Chinese leaders over the years."6 Kissinger was confident that U.S.-Chinese relations was the
best international decision the United States could make. He also seemed confident that he
would able to put his name in the history books as the main figure who helped the United States
and China finally establish official diplomatic relations with each other. This hope for Kissinger
was deflated in 1976.
The year 1976 brought a new era of relations and leaders for both the United States and
China. But the new era did not start off calm. 1976 was a chaotic year for both the United States
and China including the relations that were trying to spawn from decades of interaction. The
United States had a Presidential election which is always full of chaos and round-the-clock news
coverage. China had a revolution after Mao passed away and the question of who would follow
his leadership was did not have an answer. In 1976, the task or hope of creating new and
evolved relations between these countries were put on hold by both sides because of the battles
for leadership in both of these countries. With 24/7 news coverage, a major newspaper in the
United States, The New York Times, covered domestic and international topics. Attitudes of this
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coverage depicted optimism, worry, and confusion throughout this year to give a different
outlook on what should, could, and did happen with: the United States Presidential election
between President Gerald Ford and Governor Jimmy Carter, Carter's foreign policy outlook, the
change of leadership in China, and what some international spectators outlook was on what was
occurring in both the United States and China. A change ofleadership in any country can be
messy and U.S. politics does not make this process any smoother.
One of the most chaotic aspects of U.S. politics is the almost two-year long process of
running for Commander in Chief. By the time the field is narrowed down to two, most people
are ready to just vote, so they can live their daily life without hearing about on every news outlet
they explore. This is also a time where voters get to match up both candidates and decide who
will be better to lead the future of this country. The debates are a major way to allow voters to
perform this match up. While it was not a main topic of all of the debates, particular insight on
the goal ofChinese relations were also given in these debates. Interestingly, between President
Gerald Ford and Governor Jimmy Carter, they knew what they appropriate end goal would be,
but had no idea what the needed steps were to get there. During the debate, "both candidates
repeated their support for normalizing relations with Peking while maintaining Taipei's security"
and "Mr. Carter accused the Administration of 'frittering away' the opening with China started
in 1972, but he did not say how he would do better."7 This just showed that each candidate had a
groundbreaking goal, but had no idea what to do to achieve it. This can be pretty scary since
China is not an enemy a country wants to have and the choices for President is someone who is
completely inexperienced in foreign policy {Carter) and one who has been Vice President and
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President sometimes dealing directly with Chinese leaders. That is just how elections go
sometimes.
During every election cycle, there are always ebbs and flows of success for each
campaign. Governor Carter's campaign ''for the Democratic nomination was sometimes called
brilliant, but his fall campaign against President Ford has been less sure-footed and his standing
in the polls[...] dropped precipitously." The drop reportedly occurred because of many factors
but are mainly attributed to "what some regard as intemperate attacks on Mr. Ford and in
distractions that diverted attention from his major themes and that at times were frivolous and
made him appear to be losing control of events." 8 It is always nerve-wrecking for a candidate to
do so well in the primaries to just drop in polls as the main event is underway. This showed that
Jimmy Carter wasn't always the perceived winner and that the future of these relations could
easily have taken a different route.
The other interesting aspect of elections is that the incumbent has time to either play it
safe or take risks that may help the voting population lean towards or against them. In terms of
relations with China, Ford actually took a risk during the election season. Prior to the election,
Ford argued that China would not be involved in any arms or any other military advancement
equipment deals. Most of the American people also felt this was a solid plan of action. Then, all
of a sudden, a little under a week until the Presidential election, newspapers and other media
outlets reported that President Ford had approved "the sale of China of a computer system with
both military and industrial capability." Some Administration officials said that, "in approving
the sale, Mr. Ford was waiving established safeguards on the advice of Secretary of State

8

"News Summary," New York Times, Oct 29, 1976, http://www.proguest.com.

Kissinger as a gesture to China's new leaders."9 The two most controversial aspects of this
whole report was that this computer is said to be capable of making calculations on nuclear tests
and that it was sold to the China, but not the Soviet Union. Ironically the next day a little blurb
in The New York Times stated:
An article of The Times yesterday incorrectly stated that the Ford Administration
had authorized the sale to China of a type of computer system denied to the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is also getting a similar type of system. • 0
Not only did a very influential newspaper make a mistake on an article right before an important
election about a hot issue, but also that President Ford decided to give a possible helping hand to
the Chinese AND the Soviet Union when you still have more than half of the population in fear
of general communism and almost everyone not trusting the Soviet Union. This may have been
Ford's political suicide if this attracted enough attention from the masses. This showed how one
little thing can possible just the course of history and especially the course of U.S.-China
relations since Kissinger would have been in power for another 4 years.
The Presidential election was worth mentioning because it gave the outlook of wondering
if it really matters who the next president is. James Reston asks, "does it really matter between
Ford or Reagan, or between Carter and Humphrey, Udall, Church, and Brown?" And responds
by stating that "all of them would be bound by the commitments of the past at home and
abroad."11 This observation could also be true. There could easily be a chance that it wouldn't
have mattered if President Ford toppled Carter. This establishment of official diplomatic ties
with China could have happened at the same time. His statement is also factual. There are many
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occasions where Carter couldn't make the progress he wanted to because of his predecessors'
promises. It would be interesting to see if a Ford presidency would have created the same
outcome as Carter's did. But we will never know.
Another fascinating aspect of the establishment of a Carter presidency that can relate to
the establishment of diplomatic ties with China was Carter's foreign policy outlook as he was
running for President. A general commentary that was given to the Carter campaign was a well
planned enigma Some felt that Carter purposefully gave his campaign this image because that's
how he wanted it to be. As un-presidential as that may sound there was a strategy behind it.
"Right from the very beginning of the Carter campaign, the trick has been to stay as fresh and as
new and, perhaps, as enigmatic as possible. He has been able to wade through more than a year
of selling himself all over the country without revealing much of his merchandise." 12 This right
here may be the reason he snuck into the people's hearts and minds of America to be victorious
in the Presidential election against Ford. This may also hint at reasons why his China policy
started with his goal in mind, but the steps were mostly taken by his advisors to help him achieve
his goal. Carter may have never had a solid plan for U.S.-Chinese relations. Maybe he was just
playing the game and being optimistic that he could accomplish this if he became President.
This enigma factor might have been put into place to hide particular flaws in his ideology, so it
looked like he had everything planned out accordingly. This, in fact, could possibly be why his
advisors took most of his essential steps to help Carter meet his goal for himself and the promise
to the American people.

12
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Regardless if the enigma tactic worked, Jimmy Carter still had a fierce opponent in Ford.
Even though Ford had some major goofs like wrong word choices and vague answers, he still
had the experience a lot of voters look for in a President. As on article wrote, "Jimmy Carter is
obviously the political rookie of the year, but he is vulnerable to the charge that he knows very
little about foreign affairs at a critical time in the transition of political power in China, the
Soviet Union, Japan, the Philippines, Europe and the Middle East." 13 This was a good point.
Why would the American people vote for someone with little knowledge of foreign affairs when
so many revolutionary events are occurring in the international community? This was an uphill
battle for Jimmy Carter, but clearly his general direction, goals, and hopes for his international
policy were enough for the American people.
Carter's foreign policy direction may not have been laid out in step by step plans during
the election season, but he still did have aspirational goals that would improve general
international relations especially when it came to U.S.-China relations. One of these ambitious
goals was that "he believed the United States 'must pay more attention to China and to Eastern
Europe,' adding that 'it is in our interest and in the interest of world peace to promote a more
pluralistic Communist world. "'14 More specifically when it came to China, his goal was "'early
movement' toward diplomatic relations with Peking is favored-which implies a break in
diplomatic relations with Taipei." But adds that "this is sought in the context of a 'peaceful'
resolution of the future of Taiwan-something on which Peking has refused to commit itself for
a quarter-century." 15 Jimmy Carter was very optimistic when he mentioned foreign policy on the
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campaign trail. Optimism doesn't tend to be a bad thing, but people will hold it against someone
if things are delivered as promised. Overall, Carter believed that the United States could be
doing more in the international community making it a safe or more peaceful world. He had no
intentions of sounding a war cry against country and instead just sit down and discuss issues with
other leaders like the true essence of diplomacy. His original goal was to make sure Taiwan was
safe throughout the whole process, but Carter may have not completely believed in that idea and
might have been just saying it for more votes.
One of the most interesting views about the U.S. foreign policy direction was an article
by William Safire. William Safire was a more conservative journalist from The New York Times
who was a main critic of Carter and his policies. This find noticed that a particular Professor
Cohen has either intentionally or unintentionally had previous presidents follow his ideas. 16
Ironically, President Carter followed this layout almost completely how Professor Cohen
suggested. Professor Cohen suggested that the U.S. should not pick China over the Soviet Union
and that they should treat both of them evenly. He also suggested it is time that the U.S. de
recognizes Taiwan and to establish a full-sized embassy in Peking. Mr. Safire thought otherwise
though. He believed that Taiwan would one day soon be conquered by force. He also bluntly
stated that this policy does constitute and abandonment of Taiwan and even the selling out of
Taiwan in to a Communist subjugation. To sum up his complete opinion on this matter he
stated:
The Cohen-Carter view contains important qualifiers and is the product of a
serious expert who commands respect and deserves lengthier analysis. The view
is profoundly wrong, in my opinion, in its central assumption-that Taiwan is
more important to the Chinese than America's resistance to the expansion of
Soviet influence. The view is mistaken, too, in warning that if we do not break
16 NVT 10

with Taiwan so as to upgrade our liaison office in Peking to an embassy, the new
leaders in China will grow impatient with us and re-embrace Moscow. The only
policy that will encourage China to remain an opponent of Moscow is United
States firmness toward Moscow. Certainly, China wants Taiwan, and would grab
it, given the chance-but the Chinese leaders out first things first and the balance
between the "barbarian" superpowers comes first. 17
Mr. Safire's view was not wrong because certainly everything he suggests could be completely
true. He really thought the U.S. should take a more aggressive step and induce Chinese
cooperation by using the threat of that cooperation to negotiate more aggressively with the
Soviets. Mr. Safire was looking for a more aggressive policy because that what he was
accustomed to with most of previous Presidents. This was just not the way Jimmy Carter would
prove how he conducted his role in the international community especially when it came to
China and the Soviet Union.
Throughout 1976, was a nation in flux. With the death of Mao, leadership went into a
frenzy since he did not really pick a successor. When decisions were not being made, the people
of China protested, and the leadership changed. It was reported that, "the Chinese leadership,
moving in a deteriorating political situation, deposed Deputy Prime Minister Teng and appointed
Hua Kuo-feng as Prime Minister of China and First Deputy Chairman of the Communist
Party." 18 This event lead to a whole debacle in American politics wondering if this leadership
change would affect the progress of U.S.-China relations. When any power shift or struggle
occurs in any country, there is always no certainty about what might follow. China was no
exception in 1976. But Secretary of State Kissinger stayed optimistic. He was reported stating,
"Chinese-American relations will not be set back by Mao's death." 19 Kissinger may have known
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something that the American public did not considering his forms of communication with the
Chinese, but it really did not affect U.S.-Chinese relations. With that said, the future of U.S.
China relations was still completely uncertain for the next President of the United States at this
time.
Along with this optimism form Secretary of State Kissinger, other views formed on what
the future of relations would be between the United States and China. One of these views
analyzed if the United States was taking the right approach to China's revolution.20 This view
recognized that many American analysts saw the latest developments in China as steps to
pursuing a more moderate international course. This also included establishing closer ties with
the West. Other analysts also saw that these new leaders of China weren't radicals like some
expected. But an argument can be made that radicals may in fact slow down or even halt
international relations within the international community while "practical-minded" leaders may
just patch up ties with Moscow more energetically. This view concluded that there has been
some criticism that the United States has moved too slowly to establish full diplomatic relations
with China, but overall, the general approach to China has been acceptable. The other view was
more internationally based. This view essentially asked what these changes occurring in China
will mean for the rest of the world.21 This view recognized that usually in time of turmoil, China
traditionally turns inward to focus on domestic before international. This essentially means that
analysts with this view do not expect any dramatic changes in foreign affairs, which may mean
that a diplomatic opening with the United States could be given less emphasis. Both of these
views were taken from valid assumptions and at that time, it really was just a guessing game to
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see what the next President of the United States would have to encounter when trying to establish
ongoing and healthy new relations with China. This may also be a reason why neither U.S.
Presidential candidate could not outline a step by step plan for the future ofU.S.-Chinese
relations because there was so much uncertainty that they didn't want to make promises they
couldn't keep.
Along with these views, there were public opinions that held their own views. Public
opinion will always be part of society and when major events happen more opinions will surge.
Two of these opinions had different outlooks on the events going on in the United States with the
election, in China with the revolution, and the relations between these two countries after this
year passes. The first opinion is someone from the United States that has an insight on which
country we should "tilt'' towards between the Soviet Union and China. It states:
We {the United States) should remain neutral in their quarrel {border tension
between the Soviet Union and China) but ponder, 'Who should we be neutral
ag'inst?' Since expansionist Russia is the global threat today, while China will be
hors de combat for a decade or more, wisdom dictates that we "tilt" toward China
to maintain the Eurasian balance for the foreseeable future.22
This made a very futuristic insight of how China may be the next threat to the United States'
standing in the world. This insight saw that China has the capability to be the next global
influence when it is not injured as the opinion states. It also thought that the in the best interest
of the United States, the U.S. should tilt towards China to keep a balance on that continent.
On the contrary, the other opinion comes from a political correspondent from Moscow.
Mr. Nekrasov, the political correspondent from Moscow, saw that "if this proposal (establishing
full diplomatic ties with China) were designed to normalize U.S.-Chinese relations, it could only
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be welcomed by the Soviet Union as part of the talks of promoting peaceful ties between all
nations."23 This may or may not be true considering the circumstances, but one insight of this
opinion does make a fair assessment of the American press and people. He notes that peace
doesn't seem to be the intent of neither of those entities. He sees that authors of the press tend to
openly express hope that closer relations between the United States and China would actually
increase the tension in Soviet-China relations. This interesting observation makes it seem that
America in general doesn't want international tensions to relax. Mr. Nekrasov also pointed out
that, "as far as the present situation is concerned, Peking's stance suggests that those countries in
greatest danger may be those Chinese neighbors whom Peking considers both economically and
militarily weaker."24 This opinion can be looked at from two different angles. One is that the
Soviet Union just had someone write to The New York Times to save face for the Soviet Union
and stir things up so China doesn't receive the U.S. as a strong ally since there are complications
between the Soviet Union and China. Or it can be a hint that the Soviet Union also wants
peaceful international relations and the United States should stop being paranoid about the Soviet
Union and trying to stay one step ahead instead of working with them. These two public
opinions showed the range of views that could be expressed by the general masses.
Public opinion is tricky in this since. It is easy to look at non-leadership accounts of
situations and pass it off as that's what everyone during that time was thinking. But not
everyone is going to have that opinion and sometimes it may even be the minority opinion. The
other aspect of public opinion statements like these and that the intention behind them are not
laid out. The intention will never be known unless you look into their personal history. That
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being said, these are still helpful accounts to see what people are thinking during the chaotic year
of 1976. Both of these opinions give different ideologies and insights into U.S.-China relations.
Each one has its own merit and valid points and gives insight what people from two separate,
internationally involved countries have to say about one another. The insight from the U.S.
paints a cautionary path, which Jimmy Carter seemed to eventually take.
Jimmy Carter had the purest intentions when he was submerged in the mess that was U.S.
and China relations. This was shown during the first Presidential debate on October 61h, 1976.
Both candidates were asked if they, in the next four years, would normalize relations with China.
President Ford gave a safe answer and said he would in a traditional sense. This would be
accompanied by making sure Taiwan is protected the whole time. He stated this in a presidential
debate knowing that secret deals would prove otherwise. But Carter, not completely knowing
about these secret deals of Nixon's and Ford's past answered:
In the Far East I think we need to continue to be strong, and I would certainly
pursue the normalization of relationships with the People's Republic of China. We
opened up a great opportunity in 1972--which has pretty well been frittered away
under Mr. Ford-that ought to be a constant inclination toward friendship. But I
would never let that friendship with the People's Republic of China stand in the
way of the preservation of the independence and freedom of the people on
Taiwan.25
On the issue of the U.S.-China relations, that was a perfect answer. It was what most of
Americans wanted to hear on this issue. The points that America will not be intimidated by
another country, a slight jab at the other candidate, and that Taiwan would be safe from any
Chinese oppression while still establishing diplomatic ties were what everyone wanted to
happen. And you could tell that Carter believed this too considering he exclaimed multiple times
25

"Presidential Campaign Debate," October 6, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6414.

throughout the campaign on this topic that President Ford didn't do enough to grow the
relationship between the U.S. and China. Carter even took office intending to establish official
diplomatic relations with China. What presidential candidate Jimmy Carter did not realize at this
time that there was a lot more to it.
After an election, there is always hope, criticism, and challenges that are laid out for and
by the next President of the United States. The topic of Chinese relations didn't have an
exception to this rule. With the theme of hope, a New York Times article pointed out that
"Jimmy Carter will inherit a world situation not free of crisis but one that is not likely to demand
immediate agonizing decisions." Also adding that "Mr. Carter will have time to play himself
gradually into his self-appointed role as 'the spokesman' for the nation in the area of foreign
affairs" which was true.26 Carter became President when the U.S. was not involved in anything
that desired his leadership the minute he stepped in the oval office. The international community
was calm in general. This definitely gave him time to set a base for his experience in foreign
affairs. The same article also hoped that the Carter Administration will be able to make gradual
contact with new regimes of Indochina along with expanding relations with China. The author
recognized that the terrible burden of the Vietnam War is in the past and that relations with Japan
are evolving in a healthy state. Like most Americans, the article also hoped that Carter abides by
his promise of keeping Taiwan safe and independent. Carter also held a lot of hope and
optimism that this author laid out. These facts also helped Carter establish a policy that was not
as aggressive not only with China, but also in general.
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The main criticism of Carter, right after the election season, was his inexperience in
foreign policy considering he was the former governor of Georgia. In particular, sometimes
Carter would forget that words and phrases could be taken a different way and completely not
get across his actual point. There was one instance where William Safire decided to question
Carter about a speech he gave to the Senate that said "'there will be times, when nobody needs to
know about a foreign policy challenge except me and the Secretary of State, or sometimes
perhaps just me and the head of a foreign government. "'27 Mr. Safire did not think this statement
was presidential regardless of the lack of experience Carter had at this point. He proceeded to
question Carter on what he could mean by that if there was any case in the United States' history
where nobody needs to know about a foreign policy challenge except him and the Secretary of
State. He continued to ask if any such challenge should be kept secret from the whole United
States and what person would sign up to be his Secretary of State of national security advisor if
they might just be cut out of the loop entirely. William Safire ended on a more pessimistic note
by the end stating:
Years from now, Jimmy Carter will be able to make a secret summit deal, or
reach an unadvised understanding, and will alter look at angry Senators and say:
'But that's exactly what I told you I might do. And there wasn't one word of
objection out of any of you.'28
Carter faced a lot of criticism for his inexperience in foreign affairs. This may be why when he
was running for office he did not share any solidified foreign policy plans and that he brought
people into his cabinet that were more knowledgably and strong-willed on foreign affairs.

27
28

William Satire, "Era of Good Feelings," New York Times, Dec 09, 1976, http://www.proquest.com.
Satire, "Era of Good Feelings," New York Times, Dec 09, 1976.

There were many challenges Carter faced in the next four years and his goal of
establishing official diplomatic ties with China was no easy feat for President Carter. Right after
the election, Fox Butterfield released a report that outlined the many challenges the Carter
Administration was going to face in Asia. When it came to China, he thought that the most
difficult decision is when and how to rescue the stalled movement toward normalization of
diplomatic relations with China. One of the main reasons was because there were reports that
"officials in Peking have indicated that they are unhappy with the lack of progress on the
ultimate withdrawal from Taiwan promised by President Nixon, and they were particularly upset
with Mr. Carter's remark during the televised debates that he would not establish relations at the
expense ofindependence and freedom ofTaiwan."29 President Carter may have not been
informed that Nixon promised the Chinese to withdraw from Taiwan which he promised he
wouldn't throughout the campaign. This made relations difficult because the Chinese had no
plans of receding from their idea to have Taiwan to be completely part of their country. Carter
would either have to find a way to negotiate with China, so they can be satisfied with the idea of
an independent Taiwan, or Carter was going to have to retract one of his campaign promises and
general American public opinion and withdraw the U.S. government and protections from
Taiwan. This would be a huge issue in the endeavor to establish official diplomatic ties with .
China
In the beginning of the Carter administration, Carter focused on other matters than
relations with China. Carter's main foreign policy focus went into the negotiations of the
Panama Canal issue. This made the Chinese leaders completely skeptical with the Carter
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administration. This was mainly because the other officials under Carter's Administration who
were communicating with China were promising less than Nixon and Ford especially when it
came down to the issue of Taiwan. China was accustomed to special treatment under the Nixon
Administration and eventually Ford administration that they expected the same from Carter.30
This put a definite rough patch in plans for the Carter Administration, but eventually concluded
the negotiations to establish official diplomatic ties.
Before this was even put into motion, President Carter had to establish himself in both the
domestic and international community. In his first Presidential report to the American People,
one of his main points was that he was going to reform the U.S. Government. In doing so, the
Government would also become as open and honest as it could be.31 During this report, Carter
also made a couple of commitments to foreign policy. He was determined to have a strong. Lean,
efficient, fighting force along with a policy that would be based in close cooperation with allies
and worldwide respect for human rights, a reduction in world armaments, and that all policy
would reflect the moral values of the United States. President Carter promised to continue
expressing concerns about human rights violations without upsetting any efforts towards friendly
relationships with other countries. This last bit was interesting because what does that mean.
You will be a strong advocate for human rights, but you won't address the issue if it with a
country you are trying to establish relations with? Wouldn't most of the countries Carter would
have to express issues on the stereotypical image of human rights be with countries the United
States is trying to better relations with? When it came down to it, what Carter said gave him a

30 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and The Making of
American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 124.
31"The Text of Jimmy Carter's First Presidential Report to the American People," New York Times, Feb 03,
1977, http://www.proquest.com.

scapegoat just in case he brings up the issue of human rights with one country, but not the rest
which he eventually did.
After the beginning months of 1977, President Carter was in full force of playing the role
ofleader of''the free world." He was trying to accomplish the most he could in the time he was
allotted. His sites set on China in late 1977 and into 1978. There were many obstacles that he
had to overcome to get to his goal of establishing diplomatic ties with China. Not only did he
have to deal with disagreeing close cabinet members, but also trying to negotiate in the best
interest of the United States and his track record for the election in 1980. Overall, Carter
achieved his goal. There is no doubt about that. But it was overshadowed because part of his
intentions did not play out publicly well to most ofthe American population.
In the beginning, Carter refused to budge on the issues that the two previous presidents
secretly did, especially with the requirements the Chinese wanted with Taiwan. Until Carter
started to solely focus on the U.S.-China relations, no progress occurred. After his Panama
Canal matter was complete, President Carter trekked through the muck that Nixon, Ford, and
Kissinger created and finally made the United States have official diplomatic ties with China
This muck President Carter had marched through created a lot of different commentary
on how he handled everything with the establishment of official diplomatic ties with China. One
of the biggest concerns, James Reston commented on. He thought that ''there (was) something
very pragmatic in all this [ ...] but he (Carter) could be getting into trouble, because he is doing
the one thing he promised he wouldn't do-letting his politics get in the way of his principles."32
He saw that politics in the way of Carter's message in multiple ways. One example is when
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President Carter sent Secretary of State Vance to Peking when even his own aides in the Cabinet
agreed that there wasn't any chance of an agreement on the negotiations about Taiwan. This trip
raised the questions of Carter's judgment in general. It seemed like it was the wrong mission,
about the wrong topic, and everybody in his Administration knew it. "And the paradox of all
this is that the Carter Administration's policies and objectives with Moscow, Peking, Jerusalem,
Panama and Havana may be right, but their tactics are very odd."33
Another question, brought to light by William Safire, was on Carter's judgement. This
time it was on another trip he ordered, but this time it was for his son. Safire concluded with the
thought that it's ironic since "the President sends his son to Peking this week to signal an interest
and to scare the Russians. But Chinese leaders would be far more impressed by a show of
American backbone in helping Zaire stem the Soviet-Cuban invasion."34 He immediately after
commented that this is just another example of weak-kneed Carter Doctrine that only encourages
the Chinese to accommodate the Soviet Union in their international policy. This showed that not
only is Carter starting to play politics with the Chinese for official diplomatic ties, but also there
is a good part of America that worries about the Soviet Union establishing better ties. Politics
will always be played by a President whether they like it or not because the candidates and the
general public doesn't know everything that happens behind closed doors. Each President has to
account for past dealings when trying to do anything and Carter had to deal with the Nixon,
Ford, and Kissinger mess. This account also gave a slight insight to public opinion too. This
showed that the American public may want peace, but they throw caution to the wind. They do
not want the Soviet Union to be able to be stronger than the U.S. in any way. They would rather
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have the Soviet Union all by themselves internationally than having any ties with the United
States or China.
Other commentaries that fonned in between the start of Carter's presidency and the date
official diplomatic ties with China were established ranged from wondering if the Carter
administration was in a rush to Carter's goals with China and even the general outlook if
diplomatic ties were even going to happen. Another report by James Reston brought a different
insight to the Vance trip mentioned earlier. As before, he mentioned that this upcoming trip
illustrated a problem because neither side are ready to settle the issues at hand. They would talk
with him, but not agree with him. This problem is that "there is something very amiable but also
a little confusing about the Carter Administration's diplomacy. It is in a great hurry."35 This
raised a good point that the Carter Administration may have too many things on their plate and
President Carter did not have the set plans to delegate properly to each matter, so he just kept
sending himself or trusted associates to try and complete the matter. Carter may have rushed the
negotiations with China which may have hurt him in the end because of what happened with
Taiwan.
During this time, Carter even addressed his goals with relations to China. It was reported
that:
The President also reassured China that the United States planned to involve it in
the fonnulation of its global policies. China is 'a key force for global peace,' the
President said. 'We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on
the problems that confront all mankind. We hope to find a fonnula which can
bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us.36
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During the same address he sketched out dimensions of the new American foreign policy in
which he seeks improved relations with China. This was very sincere and optimistic coming
from Jimmy Carter. This also displayed that President Carter wanted to normalize the nation of
China into the international community which was one of his intentions.
Another commentary that formed during this almost two-year time period was on the
general outlook on if establishing these international ties were even plausible. Reports show that
the outlook was not grim, but no one was going to hold their breath waiting for anything to be
established. One report in particular thinks that the Carter Administration will remain unwilling
establish these ties unless Peking assures the U.S. that it will not move against Taiwan. But it
did state that that both countries "may continue to seek further steps toward normalization short
of gull diplomatic relations, such as more trade and increased exchanges."37 This report held
some optimism that there may be a solution to find a gray area that both countries can agree
upon, but the author also thinks that the gray area would actually have no one happy including
Taiwan. This outlook seemed bleak and probably during those years, it did. When it came down
to it, President Carter surprised the whole nation when these ties were solidified. There was not
really a warning or a big build up to the moment. It kind of just happened which is why most of
these reports do not show any sign of monumental progress.
All this commentary has truth to it and it was proven in an end of the year interview with
President Carter. The blurb was short and sweet, but it spoke volumes. President Carter "thinks
that we will make progress in our dealings with China" in the upcoming year.38 Notice that
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Carter saw general progress, but not the complete established diplomatic ties that did actually
occur in 1978. Does this mean that even Carter did not see in the short future that official
diplomatic ties would be established? Would this imply that Carter was actually rushing his
foreign policy to reach his goals? Or was it just the right time and it had to happen then? Only
Carter and his closest associates would know. But this does give validation to all these reports
that had almost no idea what was actually going to happen for U.S.-China relations. Establishing
these official diplomatic ties was a highlight and a feat of Carter's presidency, but it may have
been just because he was at the right place at the right time.
The biggest threat to the efficiency of the Carter Administration was the constant
disagreements between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Both advisors differed on the
topic of China and both fought to have the President side with their ideals. Scholars tend to
disagree on who ended up having more influence at the end of the time in the White House.
Brzezinski was the driving force behind a lot of Chinese developments, but Vance always
cautioned the President with the steps with China and worked many other foreign policy issues
in the Carter administration. Scholars tend to differ on who they believe ended up having more
influence in the Carter administration on the relations with China. Breck Walker argued that
Cyrus Vance had more of in influence over the relations with China, but was overshadowed by
other foreign affairs and Carter's reliance on his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski.39 Enrico Fardella argued that Zbigniew Brzezinski had a more prominent role
behind the scenes than anyone else and he also argues that Carter's success with China was
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mainly due to him being in the right place at the right time in history.40 Patrick Tyler argued
China was put on the backburner longer than expected because of intense internal competition
from Brzezinski and Vance along with other internal difficulties. He also argued that this made
normalization harder then it needed to be.41 These scholars shed a different light on the topic.
They all have merit since Vance was part of the picture until the very end and the internal
struggle took its toll on the normalization efforts, but Carter was clearly influenced by one
advisor over the other on different foreign policy issues. Fardella is closest to the truth when he
argued that Brzezinski had the most prominent role and that him being at the right place at the
right time helped achieve the Carter's goal of establishing official diplomatic ties with China.

As

history does sometimes, new information has the possibility of changing who really was the
advisor Carter listened too.
There were some advantages and disadvantages that emerged out of Carter's decision to
establish diplomatic ties with China. One ofthe main advantages was that President Carter
helped to normalize the nation of China into the global community. It did not reach a complete
global scale since history would play out that Carter only had 2 years left in his term. But Carter
did start the normalization process within the United States. One way Carter started the
normalization process within the United States was through broadening the social basis.42 Carter
did this through educational exchanges. The U.S. received a disproportionate number of Chinese
exchange students, but Carter saw this as an opportunity to make part of the younger generation
more sympathetic towards the United States which would help the relationship for the future.
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The Chinese viewed this opportunity to create a better/smarter newer generation that would
ultimately help the Chinese society as a whole. Even though the Chinese leaders later became
paranoid that these students would disrupt the order of their society and a lot of Chinese students
used every path to stay in the U.S. longer since their homeland offered them almost nothing, this
scholarly exchange was still part of the path to a global normalization.
The other way Carter helped normalize China into a global community was extending
their trading partnership to most-favored-nation privileges. At first, Carter did not know if it was
going to be a good idea because he did not want to create a complete imbalance between the two
biggest communist countries, the Soviet Union and China. Carter's National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, urged Carter to follow through while his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
warned Carter to be cautious. This most-favored-nation trading status allowed China to have a
freer trading partnership with the United States. It dropped tariffs and opened China to do
business and trading on a global scale. This was the first major step towards the economic
powerhouse that is China today. One of the more concrete ways that it was shown that China
was slowly being globalized was a New York Times article.43 This article reported that China
was planning a conference on modernizing industry. This may seem something so small to
"western" nations, but this was actually a huge step for China. It proved that instead of China
retreating inwards as history usually shows, they were starting to accept more industrialized
ideals to move their country in a better internationally economic standing. By allowing China to
participate in an educational exchange and promoting China's trading privileges to a most
favored-nation status, Carter helped normalize China into the global community.
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One of the negative factors for President Carter with establishing official diplomatic ties
with China was the issue of Taiwan. In the beginning, he had the best intentions to maintain a
strong U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The obstacle was all the secret deals his predecessors made.
Nixon and Kissinger put the issue of Taiwan into China's favor. They were looking forward to
the new relationship with China so much that they ended up giving away a strong U.S.-Taiwan
relationship. By the time Carter was president, China was so used to this special treatment that
they felt they did not need to negotiate any of their requests as Carter would have wanted them
too. The main reason why Carter ended up changing his mind on the issue of Taiwan was that
the timing was a now or never type of situation. Carter just finished the politics surrounding the
Panama Canal issue and he had a good amount of time before the next SALT initiative with the
Soviet Union would occur which would be another uphill battle in the U.S. Congress. The
timing was also right after mid-term elections in the United States, so people in Congress
couldn't disagree based on wanting to win an election. This gave Carter the best opportunity to
accomplish establishing official diplomatic ties with China.
Carter did make his own power move with Taiwan towards the Chinese. It was not huge,
but in the official docwnents, Carter made sure that the U.S. still could sell weapons to Taiwan
after the following year. The Chinese leader, Deng, was infuriated, but signed it anyway because
he needed the U.S.' moral support against their planned attacks against Vietnam. James Reston
of the New York Times put the meaning of this situation the best: "He may have cut many of his
friends (the powerful lobbies and the Party), but he has probably increased his influence at home
and abroad. "44 It was a great thing to establish official diplomatic ties with a country that had an
increasing population towards 1 billion, but that doesn't mean political opponents will let you
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live down the couple million you signed away that used to be close allies. President Carter's
intentions were to maintain a strong relationship with Taiwan, but the issue surrounding Taiwan
was a negative factor for the Carter administration since Carter's predecessors put him in a tough
position and the timing was perfect to accomplish establishing diplomatic ties with China.
President Carter's main intention to establish official diplomatic ties with China was for
strategic American military purposes towards the U.S.S.R. and other Cold War issues. Carter
did not start with this intention, but his National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, slowly pushed
him towards it. After establishing official diplomatic ties, Carter turned towards military
cooperation between the two countries.45 These two countries shared the same amount of hatred
for the Soviet Union and Carter and Brzezinski played off of this. Brzezinski also saw an
opportunity to push the military relationship with China with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
He argued "that we use the Soviet invasion of a country in a region of strategic sensitivity to
Asia as a justification for opening the doors to a U.S.-China defense relationship."46 And
Brzezinski did exactly that. This relationship would later become a problem when the Soviet
Union fell, but Carter still pursued this route. The military cooperation included a joint
intelligence collection since they were the closest ally they had to the Soviet Union since the
base in Iran fell. It also included selling hardware and advanced Western technology with
military applications. This did not completely happen considering when advisors went to look at
the foundation they would have to work off of in China, it was too old to make a jump to the
modem-day equipment. The other problem was that Carter lost the election the following year
because of his public perception of missteps in foreign policy and inflation. Carter's intentions
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may have been to build a different and better relationship with China, but other obstacles got in
the way before he could do it. Carter's main intention at the time was to establish official
diplomatic ties with China for the American military strategy.
After everything was finally established with these intentions in mind, news reports,
commentary, and public opinion were so mixed for the year to come. Immediate reactions can
be summed up in one word: unmoved. Public opinion was so all over the place that a New York
Times author reported that "no major groundswell of American opinion favors closer ties with
China, despite the Carter Administration's decision last week to recognize Peking, but
Americans are not enthusiastic about supporting Taiwan either, according to a poll by The New
York Times and CBS News."47 It also claimed ''while many Americans believe Taiwan will not
be adequately protected after the planned American pullout, a sizable majority opposes further
arms sales to the Chinese Nationalists" in Taiwan. The American public was so numb to the idea
and preoccupied with the Christmas season that they just didn't take any real notice to it.
The were two competing views that the American public contained. Both were outlined
by two U.S. citizens who wrote to The New York Times to publish their ideas. One view
questioned Carter's decision weighing some of the pros and cons but concludes that it should go
back to how it was to protect Taiwan from communist China.48 While the other letter is full of
hope that it will be a healthy relationship. But this letter also pointed out that this conundrum
could have been avoided by Truman when he was President. They point out that at that time
Mao declared that China and the U.S. have the same goals which would have worked out to be a
fine partner in the international community. But Truman did not because he did not want to trust
47
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any Communists. If Truman would have just made the right move, Carter could have avoided
this with Taiwan possibly receiving a better outcome. Both of these letters showed two public
opinions that probably most of the American population had. And both these opinions have not
fully recognized the importance behind what President Carter accomplished.
Another opinion on this whole situation contributed an insight how this event relates to
the Soviet Union. Some people saw this event as a lack of strategy from Carter in that "he didn't
merely play 'the China card,' but under pressure from Teng Hsaio-ping, he strew the whole
China deck of card on the table just when the Russians were shuffling their hand."49 This was
more of a pessimistic view of what Carter was doing, but there is some truth behind it. President
Carter may have established ties with China because of strategic purposes, but everything
happened so quick that maybe he didn't see the possible consequences. There is a possibility
that Carter wanted to accomplish this so bad that he didn't actually know if this would put a
strategic edge over the Soviet Union. At this point, tension had calmed down between the
Soviets and the Chinese and some reports out of the Soviet Union were hoping for peaceful
diplomacy between the two countries. For all Carter knows, the Chinese could have been
establishing ties with the Soviet Union the same time they were with the United States. This
may have led to a more peaceful international community, but the U.S. would have lost their
strategic element. This showed that this event was also over shadowed because the American
public was concerned that the Soviet Union still had a chance to have China as an ally.
Another commentary, that occurred immediately after Carter's announcement of the new
relationship with China, found the timing of the Carter decree very interesting. This perspective
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viewed Carter's television announcement as "even more carefully arranged for minimum
exposure, coming on Friday night of the penultimate weekend of the Christmas season, after the
network news shows and too late for ample coverage in most Saturday morning newspaper,-a
hard time to start or sustain a controversy and therefore, from a President's standpoint, as good
as a time as could be found to break the old emotional commitment to the rump Chinese
Nationalist regime on Taiwan."50 This was a valid point. President Carter may have waited to
specifically settle negotiations with the Chinese and announce it this particular weekend, so any
controversy or anger would be almost overlooked in the news because it was almost Christmas.
This may also attribute to the fact that it seemed like nobody recognized the importance of this
event after it was announced. The other important insight Joseph Lelyveld offered that
reinforced his previous claim is that this was also a time of political calm. "Three Presidents
really waited for then was a moment of relative political calm at home-denied Mr. Nixon
during Watergate and Mr. Ford during his drive for the Repu�lican nomination-the kind of
moment, for instance, when an election has just passed, one Congress is ending and another has
not yet begun."51 Carter found this moment and capitalized on it. Regardless if all this helped or
hurt him when it came down to election time, he was in the right place at the right time and
decided to take advantage of it and do something historical.
The following year, 1979, was not a good time for Jimmy Carter even when it came to
comments on the new ties with China. In February of that year, a poll in Carter's home state of
Georgia showed that even with his decision to recognize China, his job rating was no better at
that moment then it was six months ago which was considered to be his lowest rating he·
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received.52 Some explanations of this poll consisted of three aspects: Carter's foreign policy
voyage is bound in shallows and miseries, no definition in his course, and Chinese actions in
Asia53 At this time, a lot ofCarter's foreign ventures were hitting a dead end or not evolving.
There was so many things President Carter was trying to keep tabs on that he dido't have time to
finish one off and move on to the next problem. Along with this, Carter had a tough time
defining a certain course of action and in times of restraint, needed to convey more firmness. In
tenns of Chinese actions part of the explanation, the article states:
The nonnalization of relations with China had its own historical logic. It does not
require the President to stand mute while the Chinese carry their new Western
banner into battle. Mr. Carter should be denouncing Peking's aggression in
Vietnam just as he denounced Vietnam's in Cambodia.54
This showed that Carter sometimes could sometimes be hypocritical by playing politics to try
and appease countries he cares about healthy relationships with. Other fonns of this evidence
can be seen when he denounces human rights violations in the Soviet Union but leaves out any
mention of China. Carter tends to get caught in the middle of spearheading a pure cause then
having to play politics to save face. It is interesting to see that these would be the explanations
for the bad poll numbers even though "Jimmy Carter has no reason to let the polls make him
apologetic about his Presidency. On the big questions he has been right: the Middle East,
Panama, anns control, China, the concern for human rights, the environment."55

52 Wayne

King, "President Gets Low Ratings in Survey of Georgia Voters," New York Times, Feb 20, 1979,
http://www.proquest.com.
53
"The Tide in Foreign Affairs," New York Times, Feb 20, 1979, http://www.proquest.com.
54
"The Tide in Foreign Affairs," New York Times, Feb 20, 1979.
55 Anthony Lewis, "ABROAD AT HOME the Carter Mystery: I," New York Times, Aug 13, 1979,
http://www.proquest.com.

By the time the election of 1980 rolled around, everyone seemed to act like it never
happened. Most newspapers used the fact the President Carter established official diplomatic
ties with China as just something to put as a track record. There was no praise or big columns
made to show that this was a huge achievement and that Carter should have another four years to
capitalize on it. Everyone just seemed to forget about it even the huge issue with Taiwan. Even
when The New York Times broke down the general ideas for Carter and Reagan on China,
Reagan just said whether he likes it or not he has to recognize China and that there really isn't
anything that would be productive sounding the horn for Taiwan. 56 Carter just mainly hoped to
expand relations. It is so interesting to think that this feat was just a fad for America. It seemed
that no one completely realized the importance of this event. Maybe it was the fact that
President Carter announced it out of no where and at a time that was slow for media. Maybe it
was that the public was so angry that Taiwan was betrayed that they downplayed the whole
event. Whatever the reasoning was, by 1980 it wasn't on anyone's mind.
It is thought provoking to reflect that most of the American public did not register the
importance of this event. Establishing official diplomatic ties with China was not only a
consequential historical event, but it put China on the map to become the economic stronghold it
is today. Maybe the American public just did not see that healthy relations with China would be
beneficial for the United States in the future or the American public was doing what it does best
and not pay that much attention to foreign affairs that doesn't have guns/conflict involved. I
think it was put best by Hendrick Smith when he reported:
'We live in a world ofimages and symbols,' one of the President's men mused
last week. 'People have a felt need for vivid, tangible leadership. It's hard to
convey, to translate the kind of steady, responsible, methodical, low-key
56

David E. Rosenbaum, "The Candidates' Stands on the Economy, Defense and Other Issues," New York
Times, Nov 03, 1980, http://www.proquest.com.

/

leadership that Carter exemplifies into the shorthand symbols that come across the
screen on the evening news.'57
It is sad to think that "the trouble with Jimmy Carter (was) his incapacity or unwillingness to
incite some of us to hate others. It is ironic that these failures are seen as Carter's weaknesses.
Almost everyone seems disappointed that he believes in practicing Christianity in politics as well
as in personal life. It will be an interesting commentary on our nation if he turns out to be our
President for only one term."58 Maybe the downfall of Carter wasn't actually his game that he
played in politics or his aspirations to tackle many foreign issues at once that made him seem
scatterbrained. Maybe his downfall was the American people.
President Jimmy Carter's intentions behind establishing official diplomatic ties with
China were to help normalize the nation of China into the global community, to maintain a semi
healthy relationship with Taiwan, and for strategic American purposes. President Carter was a
one term president and does not receive much praise for the way he handled a lot of issues. He
came to power in a time that maybe was a "fortuitous accident of history" since ''the political
leadership of the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Japan and other strategic countries [ ...]
(were) all coming to the point of political decision at about the same time."59 President Carter
started off with good intentions, but ended up cracking under the pressure and skipped a lot of
comers that only hurt him at the polls. There are multiple consequences of President Carter's
relationship with China. The biggest one being not being able establish a healthy relationship
with China since he was a one term president. This consequence has landed the U.S. in the
situation it is in now with China. Along with the consequences, President Carter tends to be
Hedrick Smith, "More than a Feeling You Can't Push America Around," New York Times, Feb 25, 1979,
http://www.proquest.com.
58
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known for his human rights initiative for the world that ended up excluding China if people
looked a little closer. President Jimmy Carter wasn't perfect and played politics as best as he
could. Some things ended up working for him and other crashed and burned. But his intentions
in the beginning were pure. There is a large gap between believing in intentions and following
through on them. Nobody is perfect, so should Carter receive the below par outlook on his
administration just for playing the game of politics that makes pure intentions disappear?
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